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Abstract
Despite more than a decade of NGO and government activities promoting developing
world farmer participation in high-value agricultural markets, evidence regarding the
household welfare effects of such initiatives is limited. This paper analyzes the geographic
placement of supermarket supply chains in Nicaragua between 2000 and 2008 and uses
a difference-in-difference specification on measures of supplier and non-supplier assets
to estimate the welfare effects of small farmer participation. Though results indicate that
selling to supermarkets increases household productive asset holdings, they also suggest
that only farmers with advantageous endowments of geography and water are likely to
participate.
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Multinational and domestic supermarkets increasingly source fruits and vegetables in the
developing world for sale in the developing world. As these markets expand, an intermedi-
ate quality-differentiated market is emerging for labor-intensive crops in whose production
small farmers might compete. These domestic supermarkets offer an option for farmers
with more rigorous requirements than traditional spot markets but with fewer risks and
strict standards than export. Large international companies like the Walmart corporation
are beginning to interact with and possibly transform horticulture marketing in the develop-
ing world. What are the forseeable consequences for poverty and agricultural development?
In several nations, such as Nicaragua, with significant small-scale farming economies,
the public and private sectors are seeking to understand the impact of Walmart-dominated
supermarket systems as the retail giant builds purchasing relationships with hundreds of in-
dividual farmers. Similarly, in the People’s Republic of China, Walmart will soon contract
with hundreds of thousands of farmers and it is imperative that the impact of such contracts
on participant smallholders is clearly understood.
The question in the foreground is straightforward: with such arrangements undergoing
dramatic expansion in many regions, are these relationships providing economic benefit
for participating farmers, or not? There is some precedent for concern. Research on the
effects on small farmers of the growth of the agricultural exports sector in Latin America
in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that growth tended to be exclusionary and that structural
changes in the agricultural sector generally benefited small farmers as laborers rather than
as independent growers (Carter, Barham, and Mesbah 1996; Barham et al. 1992).
Two critical questions have engaged researchers studying the emergence of new food
supply chains in the developing world and similarly motivate this paper: first, how will
small farmers be included in these structural transformations and second, what welfare
effects can be attributed to that inclusion.
The bulk of the recent literature analyzing small farmer participation in supply relation-
ships has focused on the correlates of participation at the household level, and on whether
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there has been exclusion based on farm size or non-land assets (Barrett and Reardon 2000;
Blandon, Henson, and Islam 2009; Key and Runsten 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius 2002; Gib-
bon 2003; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Boselie, Henson, and Weatherspoon 2003; Reardon
et al. 2003). Some research now suggests that small farmers can be included (Maertens and
Swinnen 2009; Bellemare 2012; Wang et al. 2009; Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009) though
evidence is mounting that participation may be available largely to those who are already
equipped with irrigation or cooperative membership (Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué
2007; Neven et al. 2009; Balsevich, Reardon, and Berdegue 2005).
One dimension of the supermarkets and small farmer participation story that has received
little attention is the way in which geography and access to water and infrastructure may
influence farmer participation in supply chains. Yet these characteristics may be at least as
important as farmer wealth or irrigation in influencing entry and outcomes. Our analysis
uses panel community-level data on Nicaraguan small farmers’ relationships with Walmart
and a Nicaraguan supermarket chain to analyze how observable community and household
characteristics are related to the evolution of new supermarket supply chains.
Regarding the welfare effects of new supermarket supply channels, a primary empiri-
cal challenge has been the the potential endogeneity of the observed outcomes. Welfare
outcomes measured as effects of participation may be jointly determined by observables
influencing placement of the supply chain such as access to water and infrastructure, or
unobservables influencing household participation such as entrepreneurial or management
ability. Most studies have used cross-sections, matching a group of farmers supplying a
particular horticulture crop to a supermarket with a group of similar farmers selling the
same crop into the traditional market system and relying on Heckman two-step selection
corrections to estimate welfare effects. We are aware of only two cross-sectional studies
that control for lagged asset stocks or landholdings in studies of small farmer supermarket
supply chain participation: both Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué (2007) and Neven et
al. (2009) control in their analyses of participation for landholdings, share of land owned,
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and whether the household had an irrigation system five years prior to their survey. Results
from both studies indicate the critical importance of controlling for participant asset stocks
and landholdings at the time the farmer entered the supply relationship.
Therefore, though early evidence suggests that farmers who participate in supermarket
supply chains experience higher, more stable incomes (Neven et al. 2009; Minten, Randri-
anarison, and Swinnen 2009; Key and Runsten 1999; Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009; Belle-
mare 2012), persistent identification challenges mean that significant debate continues over
whether developing world small farmers benefit. Moreover, few studies have looked be-
yond income to study effects on other critical dimensions of household welfare such as
assets.
In 2012, Walmart was the world’s third largest public corporation, with 8,500 retail stores
in fifteen countries. Their operations in the developing world increasingly are designed to
source directly from small and medium farmers; in 2010 the company announced a “global
commitment to sustainable agriculture” that set forth the goal that by 2015 the company
would sell $1 billion in food sourced from 1 million small and medium farmers worldwide.
Nicaragua is an important site for study because, as a part of Walmart’s Central American
Direct Farm initiative, it serves as a model program for Walmart’s operations with small
farmers around the world including much larger operations in India and China. Therefore,
findings on participation and effects can provide insight into much larger programs just
beginning elsewhere. Also, the Nicaraguan supermarket sector is in an early stage; the
population of small farmers directly supplying supermarkets with fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles (FFV) was around 350 in 2008, and the ongoing transition to supermarket dominance
should offer valuable insights into economic and social welfare impacts in their early phase.
Moreover, the dramatic discrepancies in the Nicaraguan rural sector, with regard to arable
land, resources, family assets, and income, all give this work a particular urgency. Re-
search distinguishing populations of likely beneficiaries from groups expected to require
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assistance will be invaluable to policymakers designing and targeting interventions. This is
a primary objective of the paper.
This article makes four primary contributions to the empirical literature on developing
world small farmers’ adaptation to new agricultural market structures. First, we demon-
strate that geographic and natural resource endowments are strong predictors of commu-
nity and individual inclusion in a supermarket procurement basin. To our knowledge, our
data is the first to characterize a national population of supermarket small farmer suppliers
over time. These unique data allow us, for the first time, to characterize the geographic cor-
relates of supply chains and the way that site characteristics interact with household asset
endowments to influence participation over time.
Moreover, our analysis, which analyzes the placement and effects of supermarket supply
chains in Nicaragua over the eight years in which the sector experienced significant growth
in the number of retail outlets, provides some insight into a major question in the develop-
ment literature: the consequences of the transformation of supply chains for nonparticipant
farmers. Given that the population of supermarket horticulture suppliers in Nicaragua with
regular direct relationships with companies in 2008 was approximately 350, our analysis
casts some doubt on speculation that supermarkets will have a major impact on nonpar-
ticipant farmers in the developing world, at least in the near term. The small participant
numbers we identify also suggest that changes in regional rural poverty and growth related
to supermarket expansion will be modest, again, at least in the near term.
The second contribution of this paper is to estimate the effect of supermarket supply
chain participation on asset stocks: investments likely to change future household incomes
and income dynamics. To date, most studies of supermarket supply chains have used cross-
sectional data on farmer revenues or incomes and have struggled to identify cleanly the
effects of participation. We use a difference-in-difference specification on data on durable
household assets and landholdings before and after participation in domestic supermarket
supply chains to estimate the effects of participation on farmers’ welfare. A combination
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of panel and cross-section data allow us to validate the quality of the recall data collected.
We find a significant effect of participation on farmers’ productive assets, an increase of
approximately 16% of suppliers’ mean pre-participation holdings but no effect on house-
holds’ consumer durables or landholdings.
Difference-in-differences exploits the time series strength of our data and offers a more
tractable and transparent method to assess impact than existing cross-sectional analyses. A
critical assumption that must hold is that, in the absence of participation in a supply chain,
the control and supplier farmer groups would have experienced similar trends. We establish
that mean asset holdings before entering the supply chain were the same for suppliers and
the control group of non-suppliers. We do this for multiple waves of supplier entry.
Third, we test for NGO impact: whether NGO-assisted suppliers are different at entry
into the supply chain from suppliers that participate independent of NGOs and whether they
exhibit different asset outcomes from non-NGO assisted suppliers. We find no significant
difference in wealth or landholdings among NGO-assisted farmers. Moreover, despite the
considerable per-farmer investment made by these programs, we see no evidence that NGO
farmers have specially accrued assets or landholdings. It appears, however, that the NGO
activities may help overcome knowledge and experience-related barriers that farmers face
as they enter the supply chain. For example, the share of exits from the supply chain by
farmers with no horticulture experience prior to the supermarket relationship is significantly
less among farmers who are assisted by NGOs.
Finally, we test for significant investment by producers in relevant assets, landholdings
or irrigation in advance of their entry into the supply chain. The possibility of such pre-
participation investment by suppliers has been a matter of concern in the empirical liter-
ature because it can complicate the analysis of household characteristics correlated with
entry. Researchers have worried that farmers’ characteristics such as baseline assets or
landholdings themselves might be endogenous to selection into the supply chain (Barrett
et al. 2011). We find no evidence to support these concerns.
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Data
Two retail groups dominate Nicaragua’s domestic supermarket sector, the ten-store national
chain La Colonia and Walmart, with 46 Nicaraguan outlets (2011). Michelson, Reardon,
and Perez (2012) and Balsevich, Reardon, and Berdegué (2005) describe the sector, the
evolution of respective procurement structures and the rapid growth in retail and sourcing
in the Nicaraguan supermarket sector since 2000. Figure 1 presents the growth in retail
outlets in Nicaragua since 2000.
This research is designed to characterize and estimate supply chain placement and wel-
fare effects of supply chain participation at a national level. To draw a supplier sample, we
designed and implemented a strategy to locate and survey all Nicaraguan small farmers who
had sold fresh vegetables1 directly to La Colonia or Walmart between the beginning of the
sector’s growth in 2000 and the time of the survey in 2008. The relatively small number of
farmers that have had direct sales relationships with supermarkets in Nicaragua made this
a feasible task. The head of fresh fruit and vegetables purchasing for Walmart’s dedicated
wholesaler Hortifruti in 2007 reported that the maximum number of small farmers with a
direct relationship with the chain in that year was around 350, roughly split between fruits
and vegetables suppliers. The head of purchasing for La Colonia reported that the chain
only bought directly and regularly from one or two small cooperatives of farmers working
with an NGO.
Interviews with current and former buyers for La Colonia and Walmart established three
important facts. First, compared with Walmart, La Colonia sources only a small share of
its fresh fruits and vegetables directly from small farmers. Second, the number of sup-
plier farmers between 2000 and 2008 was relatively small. Third, supermarkets highly
concentrated horticulture purchasing among small groups of farmers who produce large
quantities of vegetables and fruits year-round. Within the range of products sourced from
small farmers, purchasing is further concentrated. For example, Hortifruti’s purchasing
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manger explained that 95% of Walmart’s tomato sold in Nicaragua in 2007 came from two
cooperatives of small farmers.
While La Colonia provided lists of current and former suppliers and supplier coopera-
tives, Walmart was unwilling to disclose the locations or identities of their current or former
small farmer suppliers. Using interviews with buyers, NGOs working in agriculture, and
farmers’ organizations, we compiled lists of communities and municipalities in Nicaragua
defining supermarket procurement basins. Nicaragua is a relatively small country, with
horticulture production largely concentrated in a few primary areas. The NGO commu-
nity is also relatively small and institutions proved well aware of one anothers activities
and projects. Nicaragua is made up of 153 municipalities. Of these, interviews identified
that 73 contained communities where farmers either had supplied supermarkets or might
plausibly supply supermarkets due to proximity to supplier municipalities or the primary
road network. Lists of supplier communities were used to conduct a supplier census, iden-
tifying all farmer supermarket suppliers of fresh fruits and vegetables. Census teams used
a snowball sampling method. Beginning in communities where interviews had identified
that supermarkets had sourced, enumerators compiled names of current and past suppliers
and assembled names of additional communities where supermarkets had purchased. If
supplier communities named by interviewees were not already included on our list, census
teams visited these communities as well. In the census, teams gathered information in-
cluding supplier name, supermarket(s) supplied, dates of participation in the supermarket
supply chain, and crops supplied.
Upon the completion of the supplier census, enumerator teams returned to all farmers lo-
cated in the supplier census and conducted a detailed household survey with the household
head. All supplier farmers were surveyed. We interviewed 425 farmers who had supplied
supermarkets in Nicaragua.
Of the 425 surveyed households, 29 interviews were incomplete, leaving us with 396
complete supplier household surveys. As a validation for our final supplier sample, we
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compare our totals with Walmart and La Colonia’s own numbers. We know from inter-
views with Walmart that the share of production sourced directly from small farmers has
grown over time and that the 2007 number was approximately 350, roughly split between
vegetables and fruits, so we expected to find 200-250 current suppliers in 2008 (including
the La Colonia suppliers). We found 244. Given the steady growth in retail outlets since
2000 (Figure 1), we expect to see corresponding growth in supplier and exiting supplier
numbers over time. Figure 2 plots the suppliers and exits, by year.
As a comparison population for a welfare analysis of supermarket suppliers, we use a
representative sample of farmer households in regions of Nicaragua where supermarkets
source fresh fruits and vegetables. We resample an existing panel with observations in
1996 and 20002.
We revisited an existing panel as a comparison group because interviews with supermar-
ket buyers as well as NGO personnel and suppliers indicated that a representative national
sample confined to historically horticulture-producing areas close to roads would offer a
good comparison for the supply chain as a whole. Note that like our supplier sample,
the non-supplier group is roughly split between basic grains growers and farmers growing
some horticulture or cash crop.
Significant qualitative work suggested a range of entry pathways through which small
farmers could become suppliers in Nicaragua. For example, buyers indicated that prox-
imity to paved roads was a primary criteria they used to identify prospective suppliers but
claimed that there were no asset or land requirements mediating participation3. NGOs re-
ported a range of criteria for their project participants; several targeted farmers for inclusion
that were formerly subsistence maize growers while others had minimum requirements for
landholdings of two hectares. Suppliers therefore represent a range of pre-supermarket
farming experience: from those who had moved from subsistence staple grain production
to those with prior experience in horticulture for the spot market.
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Finally, because the analysis studies the effects of participation in the supply chain on
households’ assets and landholdings, re-surveying an existing panel as a comparison group
provides an excellent check on the accuracy of the recall data used in the empirics. We
assess the accuracy of the recall data in Section 3.
We restricted our re-survey of the panel to the same municipalities from the supplier
sample, in which interviews indicated that farmers had supplied supermarkets or might
plausibly supply supermarkets because of proximity to primary road networks and other
supply municipalities. There were 640 farmers in the panel living in established or plausible
supply municipalities. We successfully located and interviewed 466 of these farmers. Our
attrition rate was 25.9%. An analysis of attrition shows we were were more likely to lose
low-wealth farmers that lived further from roads, biasing our comparison group towards a
higher-wealth, less isolated sample, strengthening our results in Section 3.4
We begin with a description of the starting asset, landholdings and irrigation positions
of supplier farmers. Section 2 presents the dynamic analysis of supply chain placement.
Section 3 explains the estimation strategy for the welfare effects analysis, validates the
asset recall data, and presents the results from the welfare effect estimations related to
participation and NGOs. Section 4 examines a candidate mechanisms that might drive
welfare effects. The final section concludes.
For the duration of the paper, suppliers and/or participants will refer to farmers who sup-
plied supermarkets. When referring to data for suppliers before they supplied the supermar-
ket, we will speak of suppliers pre-entry or suppliers before the supermarket. Non-suppliers
will exclusively be used to refer to farmers in our data who never supplied supermarkets
between the period of 2000 and 2008.
Supplier descriptive statistics
In this section we use descriptives to characterize the production and market behavior of
suppliers before they sold to the supermarket and to provide some background on the con-
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tract relationship. The exercise builds intuition for the subsequent analyses of participation
and effects.
Table 1 disaggregates the 396 suppliers by the supermarket chain supplied and presents
the mean relationship tenure, both (1) by retail chain and (2) by whether the farmer had
exited the supply chain or was still a supplier in 2008. Across retail chains, the mean supply
relationship for suppliers still working with a supermarket in 2008 was a little over two and
a half years. Across chains, the mean tenure for discontinued suppliers was approximately
one and a half years. Our samples of both current suppliers and discontinued suppliers are
dominated by farmers supplying Walmart (or Walmart’s predecessor, Ahold).5 Few farmers
supply multiple chains simultaneously, in fact Walmart had policies to actively discourage
supplier farmers from working with the company’s competition.
Supermarket supply contracts
Supermarket contracts with small farmers in Nicaragua generally consist of verbal agree-
ments specifying quantities of product of a specified quality to be purchased from the
farmer at a future date or dates. Prices at the date of the transaction are often set explicitly
or set with respect to reference traditional markets; minimum prices are also often set, so
the farmer knows the lowest possible price that he will receive for his production.
In June 2006 four multinational NGOs began working with Nicaraguan farmers through
a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) program designed to build
the capacity of small farmers to participate in modern markets. Supermarkets in Nicaragua
did not (as of 2008) offer credit or technical assistance to farmers or farmers’ cooperatives.
NGOs generally assist with credit, irrigation, information, and technical advice, quality
management and contract negotiation between cooperatives and supermarkets. In the case
of NGO-organized farmers, a written contract is sometimes negotiated between the super-
market and the NGO for a specified quantity and purchasing schedule.
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Suppliers’ crop production, pre and post supermarket
Table 3 presents the pre-supermarket production technologies of suppliers. One third of the
supplier farmers were growing only basic grains before they became a supplier, 14% were
cash crop farmers (mostly coffee), and a little over half had some experience with a horti-
culture crop. However, even among those with some experience in horticulture, few were
growing at the scale or the frequency required by supermarkets. Less than 30% of farmers
who grew horticulture before selling to supermarkets were farming with irrigation. In fact,
more than three-quarters of all suppliers were without irrigation prior to the supermarket re-
lationship. The distinction is important: for small farmers who farmed basic grains prior to
the contract, the move to supplying a supermarket will include both the change attributable
to producing a new higher value crop and the change attributable to the supermarket re-
lationship; while for small farmers who farmed horticulture, the supermarket relationship
will represent likely changes to production technology and marketing.
Once farmers enter the supply chain, neither their production nor their marketing be-
havior is exclusively concentrated in the supermarket relationship. Data from suppliers
indicate that the majority supplied one crop to the supermarket while selling two crops to
non-supermarket buyers and growing a mean of four crops. Table 2 presents the mean total
number of crops grown and total number of crops sold by suppliers in 2007, disaggregated
by the number of crops the supplier sold to the supermarket in 2007.
The crops gown by suppliers and the transaction frequency described in this section
suggest that participating farmers require access to the geographic and household resources
to permit year-round production schedules. A plausible empirical strategy therefore must
consider place and household characteristics simultaneously, a task to which we now turn.
Supply chain placement
Farmers enter into a supply relationship with a supermarket through a variety of pathways.
Some farmers enter through NGOs that prioritize transitioning basic grains subsistence
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smallholders into horticulture, some enter through NGOs that set minimum landholding
thresholds, others are incorporated when a supermarket buyer driving a supply route ex-
tends an invitation to a farmer with a healthy-looking field of tomatoes. Interviews with
Walmart supermarket produce buyers charged with meeting weekly regional horticultural
supply quotas indicate that buyers value two primary attributes: farmers who are easily
accessed by roads and phone and farmers who offer the agro-climatic potential to provide
a year-round supply stream.
In this section we identify the factors that correlate with entry into the supply chain at
a national level since 2000. We also test to see how the relationships between community
and household characteristics and entry into the supply chain have changed over time.
To test whether there has been some change over time in the community and household-
level correlates of entry into the supply chain, we use a linear probability model (LPM)
with fixed effects and entry into the supply chain as the dependent variable. Because there
is some concern in the literature that coefficient estimates may not be consistent in the case
in which there are only a few time-series per individual (our data include nine), we also run
a conditional logit model (Maddala 1987; Chamberlain et al. 1984). The conditional logit
model results are consistent in significance, sign, and relative magnitude with the panel
LPM and so we report the easier to interpret LPM coefficients.
Our analysis demonstrates that suppliers are on the whole a group characterized by the
agro-ecological resources to permit stable, year-round output, even when contrasted with
a comparison group selected to reflect preferential access to paved roads and horticultural
growing zones. This has been a hypothesis in the literature (Barrett et al. 2011), but ours is
the first analysis to provide evidence on this point.
Note that the bias in the selection of the control households to include higher-wealth and
less isolated households colors the interpretation of the participation analysis. Our results
suggest households’ initial land and wealth have significant but relatively small effects on
the likelihood of supplying supermarkets over time. It is probable that the small magnitude
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of the effects of productive asset wealth and land that we find are due to the bias in the
control sample. That is, compared with more characteristic sample of Nicaraguan farmers
(including those living further from roads and in less historically-productive agricultural
regions), the wealth and land coefficients might be much larger.
The 862 farmers in our sample are distributed among 496 communities; 356 are non-
supplier communities. Based on interviews with supermarket buyers and intuition from
the literature suggesting that community characteristics influence supply chain placement
through the consequences for fixed and per-unit costs of the transaction for the buyer, we
hypothesize that several classes of characteristics may determine a community’s inclusion
in a supermarket supply basin: altitude, depth of water table, year-round access to water
for agricultural production, distance to paved roads, the closest municipal market, and the
closest supermarket retail outlet in the year 2000. In communities containing multiple
households, responses for community variables were averaged across residents.
First, communities without capacity to supply year-round are regions of high cost con-
tracts because the fixed costs of the contract for the buyer are spread over a smaller number
of transactions and growing seasons. We expect supply communities to have higher altitude
(reflecting higher historical horticulture production in the country’s interior highlands),
shallower depth of water table (to permit easy well drilling for irrigation), and greater
access to water throughout the year for agricultural production.
In addition, supermarket buyers report a preference for farmers with whom they can
maintain a flexible supply relationship – updating quantities, prices, and timing the week
before a transaction. We therefore expect that variables capturing the isolation of the com-
munity including distance to a paved road and distance to the closest supermarket retail
outlet in 2000 (essentially a measure of distance from Managua, as nearly all supermarkets
in 2000 were in the capital) should negatively influence inclusion.
Based on findings in the literature (Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué 2007; Balsevich,
Reardon, and Berdegue 2005) and interviews with NGOs, and buyers, several household
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characteristics are expected to influence participation in supermarket supply chains. Given
the costs associated with transaction requirements and the supermarket payment delays
of one to three weeks, it is anticipated that farmer participation is positively associated
with wealth. However, the effect of wealth is difficult to predict, given findings elsewhere
(Michelson, Reardon, and Perez 2012) that the price risk-mitigating terms of the contract
are likely to be more attractive to poorer farmers.
Farm size is expected to be negatively associated with participation because larger farm-
ers in Nicaragua generally work in highly remunerative large scale cash crops. Because
supermarket buyers report a strong preference for farmers who can provide steady, year-
round supply streams, a farmer’s irrigated landholdings are expected to positively influence
inclusion. Productive assets and consumer durables are compiled into an index using fac-
tor analysis (Sahn and Stifel 2000) and details regarding computation of the asset index
are available in the supplementary appendix online. We consider productive assets and
consumer durables separately. We also include controls for a farmer’s total farming expe-
rience. Household demographic characteristics include: age, gender, and education of the
household head.
Table 4 reports the results of the linear probability model with fixed effects. As hypoth-
esized, the results demonstrate that community-level characteristics matter a great deal to
supply chain placement, even among a sample of households already restricted to regions
of higher agricultural potential and access to roads and markets. Community altitude, ac-
cess to year-round water, and distance to the closest supermarket retail outlet (in 2000)
are significant predictors of household inclusion. One might expect that communities with
this intersection of favorable supply characteristics also tend to have the kinds of capable
suppliers that interest supermarkets, so their robustness to the inclusion of household-level
wealth and experience variables is noteworthy.
The importance of many of the household and community characteristics changes over
time, suggesting some evolution in the required attributes to gain entry into the supply chain
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between 2000 and 2009. At the household level, the small positive relationship between
landholdings and entry diminishes significantly over time. However, total irrigation is a
significant predictor of entry only in the years 2006 and 2007; this is likely reflecting the
post-2005 NGO programs that equipped farmers with irrigation in advance of entry into the
supply chain. Finally, note that new entrants into the supply chain are significantly younger
and significantly less likely to be female over time.
Community characteristics related to productive capacity and environment are increas-
ingly important over time for supply chain inclusion: altitude and year-round access to
water are significant and positive predictors of supply chain participation whose magnitude
grow between 2000 and 2009.
Results in Table 4 are noteworthy in two respects. First, we find evidence of the exis-
tence of corridors of higher economic potential, areas that, because they are endowed with
relative proximity to roads, optimal growing conditions, and year-round access to water are
able to participate in new market opportunities. Areas without sufficient water resources
are less likely to be included in supermarket supply chains. Second, our results suggest
that estimates of household welfare effects due to adoption of new markets should be at-
tentive to possible supply chain placement biases in addition to individual selection biases,
controlling for community characteristics relating to isolation, water access, and climate.
Our results suggest that, at least in this case, studies assessing effects at regional or national
scales would include significant placement bias should they fail to control for community-
level water, transport, and isolation variables. Note that because most existing supermarket
welfare effects studies are matched cross-sections over relatively small geographic areas,
this bias generally is not a problem in the existing literature.
Participation in these opportunities is clearly not equally available to all farmers, even
within regions of established supermarket procurement near roads and with water access.
The prominence and influence of geography in farmers’ productivity and transactions costs
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and therefore supply chain placement has been notably absent from most academic work
and policy discussions around smallholders and modern market participation.
Welfare effects empirical strategy and estimations
Two issues underlie our estimation and data collection strategies: possible bias in the wel-
fare estimates due to non-random supply chain placement and possible bias from non-
random household participation in the supermarket contracts.
Controlling for the potential bias in regional estimates of welfare effects requires that
we understand the supermarket site criteria determining which communities lie within su-
permarket supply basins. The problem for impact evaluation arises if program placement
depends on the relevant outcome variable or if placement is not controlled for in the estima-
tion. Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1993) termed the resulting bias “area heterogeneity
bias".
Results in Section 2 suggests that supermarket procurement basins are situated based on
observable characteristics related to transport and year-round growing potential; our panel
data and method allow us to control for potential bias arising from this non-random supply
chain placement.
Regarding the household selection effect, the primary empirical challenge is the potential
endogeneity of the observed outcomes, that is, that asset outcomes may be jointly deter-
mined by unobservables influencing household participation such as ability. Our panel data
method will permit us to control for this unobserved household heterogeneity.
This section begins with a validation of the recall data and a presentation of the pre-
entry holdings of suppliers and non-suppliers. We then perform a standard difference-in-
difference estimation and a version using a method to correct for potential serial autocor-
relation from Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Finally, we perform a series of
robustness checks on the results including the following specifications: omitting suppliers
who entered the supply chain with irrigation; controlling for the year of farmer entry; and
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estimating separate models for farmers who joined before and after 2006 (when the NGO
programs began to play a role). We also test for differences in effect on NGO suppliers and
on farmers who reported growing only basic grains before entering the supply chain.
Validation of recall data
We use a difference-in-differences method to compare growth in participant and non-
participant household assets and landholdings over time. Our data includes eight years
of recall on household assets, landholdings, and irrigation. Difference-in-differences is
preferable for reasons related to both data and methodology. First, there is no credible in-
strument in our data for participation in the supply chain. Difference-in-differences offers
a more transparent and appropriate method to asses impact and it allows us to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Moreover, the use of assets is attractive because they
reflect a household’s productive stock and therefore may better represent a household’s
likelihood of being poor in the future. In the case of supply chain participants, assets pro-
vide information about whether households are making investments in technologies and
productive capital that are likely to shift their productive state in the future or whether the
supply chain is merely a one or two period change in income with little effect on the house-
holds’ productive fundamentals. To our knowledge, no recent study of supermarket effects
has yet examined impacts on household asset portfolios and land accumulation.
Finally, assets may be preferred given the particular complexity of gathering income data
for farmers in the supermarket supply chain. Our data (Table 2) indicate that suppliers in
2007 grew, on average, between four and six crops. Each additional crop is likely to add
noise to a total household income calculation because the costs and marketing quantities
and prices must be gathered for each crop, often across numerous plantings within a given
year. For example, many irrigated vegetable growers in the supply chain plant in three
week cycles for a full year, producing more than 50 harvests annually. The quantities and
costs of mineral fertilizer and chemical applications for these cropping cycles can vary
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throughout the year. In addition, because supplier farmers sell, on average, about 70%
of their production to the supermarket, suppliers are often selling in multiple markets and
receiving multiple prices for their production, which vary throughout the year. What this
means is income measures for suppliers are likely to contain considerable measurement
error.
Asset data is often characterized by fewer problems of recall bias, seasonality and mea-
surement error than flow measures of economic wellbeing such as consumption or income
and research has demonstrated clear links between household productive asset holdings
and future poverty states (Carter and Barrett 2006; Carter and May 2001, 1999; Filmer and
Pritchett 2001; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Barrett et al. 2006).
A concern with using recall data is the accuracy of respondents’ recollections. This is
often only something a researcher can speculate about. However, for non-suppliers we
have both recalled values of 2000 productive assets from the 2008 survey and we have the
measured values from the year 2000 survey. We can thus assess the extent of reporting bias
associated with our outcome variables for non-suppliers.
We match measured and recalled holdings of 22 productive assets for 459 households in
the panel. Table 5 lists these assets and a constructed ratio that measures the accuracy of
recall for each asset. The ratio is computed by taking the measured value of the household’s
asset in the year 2000 over the household’s 2008 recall of their 2000 holdings. We add one
to both the numerator and the denominator to permit the inclusion of households whose
2008 recall holdings were zero. The ratio is constructed such that a value greater than one
indicates that the recall mean is lower than the true mean, so households underreported at
recall. A value of less than one indicates that the recall mean is greater than the true mean,
so households over reported in 2008 when they recalled their 2000 portfolio.
For nearly all of the assets, households exhibit a tendency to underreport slightly. Over-
all, Table 5 demonstrates that the mean tendencies are small. The effects seem to be largest
for the plow for oxen and the backpack sprayer, two of the lowest value and most widely
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held assets. The significance of Table 5 for our asset index makes sense: households seem
to remember larger, more valuable assets with a greater degree of accuracy.
We also test the relationship between the recall ratios in Table 5 and households’ annual
asset index values. We regress annual household asset indices on the household recall ratio
for the year 2000. In this way we can test if our productive wealth measures are related to
households’ tendencies to over or understate their recalled assets.
We find no statistically significant relationship between recall and wealth. We also in-
clude in Table 6 results from simple bivariate regressions that regress the households’ an-
nual productive asset indices in 2001 through 2008 on recall ratios for each asset. In this
way, we can test to see whether higher-wealth households have a tendency to over or un-
derreport holdings of particular productive assets in the recall data. A plus sign in the table
indicates that a higher index value in that year relates to a tendency to understate wealth in
recall of 2000. A negative sign indicates that a higher index value relates to a tendency to
overstate wealth in recall of 2000.
Overall, the results in Table 6 look reasonable, with no relationship between index value
and recall ratio for most assets. Two of the productive assets for which there is a relation-
ship between productive wealth and recall over time were held by less than three house-
holds. The other two assets for which there is a consistent wealth relationship over time
are the backpack sprayer and the tiller. The magnitude of the relationship of productive
wealth on tiller recall is quite small, less than 0.04, meaning for every one unit increase in
the index the household was four percent less likely to remember having a tiller at baseline.
Given that the mean supplier baseline index holdings have a standard deviation of 0.49
(with a mean of 0.37), this is a very small effect. The backpack sprayer is a widely held
asset and the effect ranges over time between 0.06 and 0.14, also a small potential effect.
We argue that our results on non-suppliers’ recalled asset portfolios also provides evi-
dence that the recall data for the suppliers is reliable. We have no reason to believe that the
suppliers would recall differently than non-suppliers.
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As a final validation of the asset data’s relationship with wealth we study the relationship
between 2007 productive assets, households’ income in 2007, and households’ use of credit
in 2007. The correlation between the productive asset index and income in 2008 is 0.32.
Regarding credit use, 357 of the 862 households reported using formal credit in 2007.
The mean productive asset index for those who used credit was 0.87 and 0.62 for those
who did not, a statistically significant difference at the one percent level. So we see good
evidence that our final period measure of productive wealth is related to other dimensions
of household welfare.
Pre-entry supplier asset holdings
The critical assumption of any difference-in-difference is that the trends, here, of accumu-
lation of productive assets, consumer durables, land, and irrigation, were the same for sup-
pliers and non-suppliers before suppliers joined the supply chain. If the trend was greater
among suppliers then the estimate of the effect of participation would be overstated. Simi-
larly, if the trend was less among suppliers then we would understate the impact of partici-
pation.
It is of course impossible to test the identifying assumption that suppliers and non-
suppliers would have experienced identical asset trends in the absence of participation.
However, because we have multiple observations (from recall) of households’ portfolios
we can test whether the assumption of a common trend holds before farmers join the sup-
ply chain. Note that results in the previous section established that there are differences in
the agro-climatic endowments of supplier farmer communities. For this reason, we cannot
use propensity score matching to match the suppliers with non suppliers. Instead, we test
for differences between supplier and non-supplier households’ asset and land holdings be-
fore suppliers entered the supermarket supply chain. Our argument is that, though supplier
and non-supplier households may have been living in areas characterized by different ac-
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cess to water, their asset portfolios suggest that they shared a similar productive state before
the arrival of the supermarket.
Table 7 compares mean annual supplier holdings of productive assets, consumer
durables, land, and irrigation with non-supplier holdings between 2000 and 2007. Because
suppliers entered the supply chain at different times, in each year we compare the
portfolios of households that had not yet entered the supply chain with non-supplier
households. Evidence in table 7 suggests that before entering the supply chain, supplier
households are similar to non-supplier households in their productive assets and consumer
durables holdings over time. Though supplier households have significantly lower mean
landholdings, we test for and find no significant difference in land accumulation trends
before entering the supply chain.
The one difference evident in Table 7 is supplier households’ irrigation. Supplier house-
holds have significantly higher mean irrigation. They are also accumulating irrigation more
quickly than non-suppliers before they enter the supply chain. Given that we cannot reject
that irrigation trends were different before suppliers entered the supermarket channel, our
estimations will not test the effect of the supply chain on farmers’ irrigation. Because dif-
ferences in irrigation holdings between non-suppliers and suppliers before entry could be
evidence of endogeneity bias, that some suppliers were on a higher-productivity path be-
fore entry, we will run a specification of the impact analysis regression where suppliers
who held irrigation before entry in the supply chain are omitted from the set of suppliers.
Because we are also interested in whether there is a special effect on NGO-assisted farm-
ers we also test for common pre-participation trends within suppliers. We find that NGO
farmers are indistinguishable from other suppliers in their pre-entry holdings of productive
assets, consumer durables, and land. These results can be found in Table 8.
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Welfare effects estimation using standard difference-in-differences
We use difference-in-differences to study the effect of the supply chain on participant
households’ asset stocks and accumulation. The difference-in-difference method will iden-
tify the average treatment effects on participants under the assumption that the selection
bias based on unobservable household characteristics is constant over time. One type of
selection bias might vary over time and affect our estimates: if outcomes in asset portfo-
lios are associated with starting differences between suppliers and non-suppliers. Note that
given that the supermarket supply market in Nicaragua remains small relative to the size of
the agriculture sector and given the geographic distribution of our non-supplier sample, we
are not worried about spillover effects from supermarket affecting the asset accumulation
of non-suppliers.
We want to test the effect of participation in the supply chain on asset stocks. Define
µit to be the mean outcome in group i at time t, with i= 0,1 for the non-suppliers and the
suppliers, respectively and t = 0,1 for the pre and post participation periods, respectively.
Suppliers before entering the supply chain therefore are in µ10 and after µ11, The objective
is to estimate:
(1) γ = (µ11−µ10)− (µ01−µ00)
where the first difference is the change in outcomes for supermarket suppliers and the
second difference is the change in outcomes for non-suppliers. We first estimate γ using an
equation similar to the following:
(2) A= β0 +β1T +β2I+ γI ∗T + ε
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Where T is a binary variable capturing differences between periods that would occur
in the absence of the participation in the supply chain, A the outcome of interest, I the
participation group dummy capturing differences between the supplier and non-supplier
groups, the I ∗T interaction is equivalent to a dummy variable equal to one for households
in the supplier group in the second period, and ε the iid error term. The average treatment
effect, the coefficient of interest, is γ .
Our data include considerably more information than a two-period panel; we have eight
years of recalled data on assets and landholdings for suppliers and non-suppliers. These
data including multiple observations for suppliers’ asset holdings in the years before enter-
ing the supply chain and multiple observations of holdings in the years after.
Because farmers entered the supply chain in different years, the estimation includes a
full set of year dummies. We create a participation variable with a lead term to test whether
farmers invest in productive assets, consumer durables, or land in advance of entry into the
supply chain. The participation variable is interacted with a dummy that indicates whether
the farmer was assisted in the supply chain by an NGO (verified using the NGOs’ par-
ticipant rolls). We include regional dummies and cluster standard errors at the level of
the household. Results are presented in table 9. See Wooldridge (2001) for details on
difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. Results for these uncorrected estima-
tions are presented in Table 9.
It has been pointed out that difference-in-difference estimates that do not account for se-
rial auto-correlation can be plagued by bias in the estimates of the standard errors (Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) and thus overstate the significance of coefficients. As ex-
pected, we find evidence of serial autocorrelation in our time series. We estimate the auto-
correlation coefficients for eight time steps by regressing the residuals on lags ranging be-
tween one and eight years. Estimated auto-correlations are significant and range between
a first order coefficient of 0.89, declining to 0.38 in year eight. This is strong evidence
motivating a difference-in-difference estimation with correction for auto-correlation.
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As expected, results tend to exhibit a stronger magnitude and a greater level of signifi-
cance than in the corrected model in the next section. For example, there is evidence in the
uncorrected regressions (Table 9) that farmers invest in productive assets before entering
the supply chain and that there are strong effects on productive assets, consumer durables
assets, and landholdings.
Serial auto-correlation DD correction
We adopt a strategy advocated by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) to explicitly
account for the serially correlated nature of the outcomes in our time series data. Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan present evidence that most standard multiple period difference-
in-difference methods significantly understate the magnitude of standard errors and are
therefore more likely to find a treatment effect where there is not one.
The two-stage strategy involves a first stage regressing the asset variable of interest on
year and regional dummies and relevant co-variates. Observations on suppliers and non-
suppliers are pooled across years. In this first stage, we include the covariates from the
placement regressions (Table 4) such as year-round water access, gender, age, and educa-
tion of the household head, parents’ landholdings, distance from closest paved road and
supermarket outlet (2000), altitude, year of cell phone access. The first stage regression
contains no measure of participation in the supply chain. Results from these first-stage
regressions are available in the supplementary appendix online.
In the second stage, residuals from the first stage regression (uit) are split into suppliers’
and non-suppliers’ residuals. The suppliers’ residuals are retained and divided into residu-
als from years before the farmer entered the supply chain and residuals from years in and
after the farmer entered the supply chain. The intuition is that the suppliers’ residuals after
entry include the effect of participation while the residuals from before entry do not include
the effect. The suppliers’ residuals are pooled into two groups: pre-entry and post-entry.
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The welfare effect and the correct standard error, now adjusted for the serial nature of the
data, are estimated using a random effects panel data model on this two-period panel:
(3) uit = Yt + γ1Iit + γ2Iit ∗NGOi+ γ3Sit + γ4Sit ∗NGOi+β3Xit + εit
Where I = 1 for years the farmer was in the supply chain and I = 0 for years before entry,
S is a lead variable with S = 1 for the year immediately preceding entry, and S = 0 other-
wise,Yt is a vector of year dummies and Xit a vector of household and regional controls. We
include S to test whether farmers anticipate entry into the supply chain by investing in pro-
ductive assets, land, consumer durables, or irrigation before they become suppliers. To test
if participant welfare effects vary according to whether the farmer entered the supply rela-
tionship through an NGO program, we also include terms interacting whether the farmer
was assisted by an NGO with the participation and lead variables. Errors are clustered at
the household level and regional dummies are also included in the regression.
Table 10 presents the results from the welfare estimation. The first column presents
results from a regression with productive assets as the dependent variable but without the
NGO interactions. Because there is little difference between these results and results in
column two when the NGO interactions are included, we present the results with the NGO
interactions only in columns three and four. The results for all models are different from the
regressions without the correction for autocorrelation (Table 9); with the correction, effects
on consumer durables and land are no longer significant and the estimate of the effect on
productive assets is reduced.
Productive assets and income
We find (Table 10) that for suppliers the mean effect of participation in a supermarket
supply chain is an increase in productive assets. The magnitude of this effect is relatively
large. Given that the mean productive asset holdings of suppliers before entering the supply
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chain was an index value of 0.36, the total effect is equivalent to approximately a 16%
increase in the household’s productive asset stock. Mean tenure in the supply chain in the
sample is 2.5 years, so if the effect is constant over the supply relationship, this would
translate into a mean increase of 6.4% annually in the household’s productive asset stock.
What might such a productive asset increase mean for income? We can regress pro-
ductive asset stocks and a vector of household and regional controls on 2007 income to
derive a relationship between the productive asset measure and expected income. The re-
sults suggest that an increase equal to the estimated magnitude in household’s productive
asset stock could be expected to translate into an increase in annual household income of
approximately US$ 200 (2007 exchange rates).
Note that if we leave out the NGO interactions, the magnitude of the effect does not
change but the standard errors decrease such that the significance level goes up.
Consumer durable assets and landholdings
We find no evidence of increases in consumer durables nor in household landholdings
attributable to participation in the supply chain. Note that if we run two separate models,
splitting the suppliers into those that joined before 2006 and those who joined in and after
2006 (when major NGO efforts got under way) we do find weak evidence of a land effect
for participants and that participants are investing in land in advance of entry. The mean
land participation effect is approximately 2.14 mz and the pre-entry investment effect is
approximately 1.36 mz. Both effects are significant at the ten percent level. These results
are available upon request.
Pre-entry investment by farmers
We find no evidence that farmers are investing in productive assets, land, or consumer
durables in advance of entry into the supply channel, something that has been a concern in
the empirical literature related to small farmer supermarket participation for some time.
NGO effect
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Given the investment made by NGOs to build the capacity of farmers to supply super-
markets, we are interested in (1) whether NGOs incorporate farmers who might otherwise
not sell to supermarkets and (2) whether NGO-assisted farmers in the supply chain ac-
crue assets or land to greater degree than farmers unassisted by NGOs. To begin with,
we test for differences between NGO assisted farmers’ productive asset stocks and other
suppliers’ before entering the supply chain and find no difference (Table 8). However, de-
scriptive statistics on tenure length and pre-supermarket farming experience suggests that
NGOs may play a critical role in keeping farmers with little experience in horticulture in
the supply chain (Table 3).
We find no special effect of participation on NGO suppliers. Note that no difference
in outcomes would be a noteworthy result if farmers entering the channel through NGO
programs were found to have less initial access to productive capital. If this were the
case, equivalent accumulation rates might indicate that NGO activities had improved the
outcomes of farmers formerly on a less-productive trajectory. However, NGO assisted
farmers’ are found to be equally endowed with productive assets and land before entering
the supply chain.
Robustness checks
We perform five robustness checks on the results. First, we run a specification in which
we control for the year that the farmer entered the supply chain in case there is some
change over time in the farmers who become suppliers. Second, we restrict the control
group of non-suppliers to farmers who were growing something besides basic grains (beans
and maize) in 2007, omitting 251 non-suppliers. This second check should compare the
suppliers with a group of farmers engaged in selling horticulture and/or cash crops and
perhaps more likely to invest in productive assets and land over time. In a third check, we
we omit the suppliers from the estimation who had irrigation before entering the supply
chain (approximately 25% of the supplier sample). Fourth, we remove the non-suppliers
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completely from the sample and tests suppliers’ accumulation in the years after entry into
the supply chain with their accumulation before entry. For all of these specifications, the
results are consistent: participation in the supply chain leads to a 16% increase in household
productive asset holdings, no effect on consumer durables or landholdings, and no special
effect on NGO suppliers. A final check retains only data from the years 2000 and 2008 and
runs the two-step difference-in-difference with autocorrelation correction on the reduced
two-year panel. The estimated effect on productive assets is twice as strong (0.12) and
significant at the 1% level.
Discussion
We have identified a strong, positive effect of participation on suppliers’ asset portfolios,
suggesting that the supermarket relationship may have lasting effects on the productivity
and poverty outcomes of participant farmers. In this section, we interrogate this result,
drawing on cross-sectional data comparing participant and non-participant farmers incomes
and credit use in 2007.
Several mechanisms, possibly related, could be subtending growth in productive assets.
First, the supermarket channel may be increasing incomes of farmers, spurring their invest-
ment in productive asset stocks; second, the relationship may directly or indirectly facili-
tate credit access allowing farmers to build these asset stocks; third, the contract itself may
alter risk-reward expectations with regard to investments in productive assets. However,
evidence supporting any these mechanisms, or relationships among them, could be com-
promised by the same challenges referenced earlier, issues of endogeneity and placement
and selection bias. For example, one might interpret significantly higher yields (bean and
maize per hectare) of supplier farmers as evidence of increased-productivity spillovers in
the supply chain. However, innately higher productivity of the farmers is likely correlated
with participation in the supermarket supply channel.
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The analysis in this section, therefore, is limited to suggestive exploration, in hopes of
motivating future research on the mechanisms through which supermarket channel partici-
pation increases supplier asset investment.
Our data indicate that suppliers report significantly higher incomes than non-suppliers.
Mean supplier income in 2007 was approximately double that of non-suppliers and ap-
proximately 25% higher than former suppliers. Of course, these farmers might have been
higher earners in the absence of the supermarket supply chain. We include information on
supplier incomes because the topic has received so much attention in the literature.
Similarly, suppliers report higher use of credit in 2007 than exited suppliers or non-
suppliers. Table contains descriptive statistics for the mean quantity of credit borrowed
by households in 2007 and the mean number of credit sources6. A much higher share of
suppliers used credit in 2007 than did discontinued suppliers or non-suppliers. Moreover,
suppliers had higher mean total credit, though not significantly so, and a slightly larger
number of credit sources, on average, than non-suppliers.
Numerous suppliers reported that their supply agreement with the supermarket system
has proved sufficient, in and of itself, to secure an agricultural loan from regional banks.
Conversely, once a farmer leaves the supply chain, he or she may be unable to access the
same level of credit. It is also possible that some of the exiting suppliers leave the supply
chain because they have not been successful at securing credit for production. Again,
causality is not possible here.
Regarding credit: one consistent finding of empirical work estimating effects of residual
risk attributable to imperfections in savings, credit, and insurance markets is that residual
uninsured risk can lead to inefficient under investment in technology adoption, and also
have adverse effects on the household in the form of foregone output (Sandmo 1971).
As previous work on Nicaraguan supermarket supply chains and small farmers has es-
tablished (Michelson, Reardon, and Perez 2012), although mean output prices paid by
supermarkets in Nicaragua are not significantly higher than output prices in the traditional
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market, prices paid by supermarkets exhibit significantly less volatility than in the tra-
ditional market. In some cases, the supermarkets guarantee (in written contracts or oral
agreements) that farmers receive a minimum output price (i.e., a price floor for the con-
tracted quantity of their production). Qualitative interviews with farmers confirmed that
this guaranteed minimum output price is a primary attractive feature of supply relation-
ships. The importance of the provision of the minimum price is some measure of insurance
against output price volatility in the spot market.
A plausible explanation for the increases in household productive asset holdings is
that, protected by the contract from the considerable output price fluctuations of the
spot market (Michelson, Reardon, and Perez 2012), farmers are willing to invest in
vegetable production, intensifying their farming and in some cases moving from seasonal
to year-round cultivation. Moreover, farmers can finance these productive investments
through increased, more stable incomes or through new household liquidity from credit
made available through NGOs or regional banks willing to accept the supply agreement as
a guarantee of a stable income source.
A narrative of increased farm household income resulting from production increases,
complemented by a decrease in output price risk reinforces conclusions from other recent
studies suggesting that longer or more frequent production cycles are associated with super-
market participation. Balsevich, Reardon, and Berdegué (2005) find that growers accessing
supermarkets plant an average of 0.6 more cycles in a year than traditional growers. Neven
and Odera (2009) find that supermarket orders for suppliers with long-term supply agree-
ments come in throughout the year. Our contribution is to link findings on increased asset
stocks explicitly to the reduction of downside output market risk.
Conclusions
The continuing rapid growth of supermarket systems in developing countries is a phe-
nomenon with critical implications for international development and poverty outcomes.
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As the domestic market share of a supermarket system like Walmart in Nicaragua rises, the
company interacts with regional farmers to satisfy demand for fresh produce. This expan-
sion of supermarket procurement channels may result in significant opportunity for small
farmers; conversely, exclusion could mean economic hardship.
Supermarket buyers generally demand that suppliers satisfy chain-specific transaction
requirements; in exchange they offer incentives that might include guaranteed purchase
volumes or prices. With regard to household welfare, can it be established that the su-
permarket results in beneficial outcomes to participant small farmers? Do farmers who
participate consistently benefit from such arrangements, either in a single season or over a
span of years?
Our research addresses a set of questions related to the large-scale issues summarized
above, and relevant for smallholders, policy-makers, and development economists. We
offer four contributions to the empirical literature on developing-world small farmer adap-
tation to new agricultural markets. First, we demonstrate that geographic location and
transport options can be decisive with regard to farmer participation in these new market
systems. What this means is not only that not all farmers have the endowments to enter
new supply chains but that we may be able to foresee the areas and the farmers that will be
excluded based on geography as the supermarket sector grows in the developing world.
Second, we demonstrate that participation in supermarket supply chains directly affects
the productive asset stocks of participant households. We find a mean increase of about
16% in household productive assets, equivalent to an expected increase in household annual
income of $US 200 (about 15% of mean 2007 income in the sample). This is similar
to magnitude effects that have been estimated elsewhere (Rao and Qaim 2011; Ashraf,
Giné, and Karlan 2009; Bellemare 2012). Because asset stocks directly contribute to future
household productivity, our results suggest that the market opportunity could have lasting
impacts on participants’ household poverty outcomes.
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Third, we find no special welfare effect on NGO-assisted farmers, nor do we find that
NGOs are drawing from a specially materially disadvantaged class of farmers (in terms of
observable characteristics and pre-participation endowments). This is a surprising result,
given that these NGO programs can represent substantial per-farmer investment and that
NGOs often mediate contract negotiation, broker market information, and provide techni-
cal assistance to farmers. Because NGO programs in the region under study started their
operations the time-span under scrutiny here, one explanation is that their involvement was
as yet too brief to show any measurable special economic effect on the farm households
with whom they interacted.
Though we find no differences between NGO suppliers and other suppliers based on their
observable wealth characteristics, NGO-assisted farmers have higher levels of education
and have more farming experience and are located significantly further from paved roads
and with a higher water table. So the NGOs may be facilitating access to areas where the
supermarket is less likely to source. NGO suppliers could also be different in unobservable
ways from suppliers that are not assisted by NGOs.
Finally, we find no evidence of significant farmer investment productive assets or land
in anticipation of entry into the new supply chain. This possibility has been a concern in
the literature for some time as researchers have wondered whether small farmers might be
making strategic investments in order to attract supply chain contracts. Because evidence of
such investments would complicate researchers’ understanding of the dynamics of supply-
chain entry, as well as of the welfare effects of participation, this finding is also important.
With respect to the development potential of supermarket supply relationships, our find-
ings here offer grounds for optimism, and also for a measure of caution. Pragmatic public
policies, when founded on accurate information and solid theory, can go a long way towards
assuring that new market configurations will benefit at least a portion of a smallholder farm
population in developing countries. In evolving such policies, however, one key issue is the
potential for smallholders to operate as entrepreneurs, profiting thereby from new private
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initiatives for production and marketing. Our evidence indicates that the contracted farm-
ers evaluated here have experienced significant gains in the acquisition of productive assets.
However, it is also clear that the location of supermarket procurement basins and the rate
of household participation are strongly impacted by access to roads, markets, and sufficient
water for crop production. With regard to projecting long-term sustainability of estimated
income and asset returns in these new agricultural market configurations, we need to be
careful: given the significant involvement of NGOs in the development of agriculture in
Nicaragua, and the fact that the supermarket sector there may still be in an early stage of
development, it remains to be seen what the regional equilibrium effects will be for the
agricultural sector as more farmers enter these markets.
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Notes
1We focus on vegetables because fruit crops in Nicaragua are mostly tree crops with
one annual harvest and are therefore characterized by different production and marketing
dynamics as well as distinct investment times to payoff.
2The original 1996 study followed a nationally representative area-based sampling pro-
cedure in which every piece of land in Nicaragua was given equal weight in the random
selection of 1,450 plots, excluding the departments of the Atlantic Coast and all production
units exceeding 500 manzanas (approx. 350 hectares, one Nicaraguan manzana is equal
to 0.7 hectares). In 2000, researchers from the World Bank in collaboration with the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin and a Nicaraguan NGO revisited the original 1,450 households. They
were able to locate 1,350 of the original households
3In fact, Walmart’s supply chain structure, in which company buyers travel to farms and
communities weekly or semi-weekly to pick up produce, means that entry is not confined
to farmers with transport.
4We are not concerned about the attrition rate because were most successful locating
and interviewing farmers living close to major roads. Because our control group therefore
is biased towards farmers living proximate to roads, our sample is likely biased towards
farmers with a higher proclivity towards market participation, it is a more suitable compar-
ison for the supplier group. Our results in Section 3 are only strengthened.
5The supermarket category Other in table 1 is mostly the retailer PriceSmart, which has
one store in Managua. The category Multiple largely consists exclusively of farmers who
moved from supplying Walmart to supplying La Colonia.
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6Respondents were read a list of credit sources and asked whether, in the previous
twelve months, any member of the household had received credit from that source. The
list of sources included: private bank, credit or savings cooperative, producers’ cooperative
or association, unconventional bank, rural bank or agricultural lender, NGO or project,
government program, commercial trader, buyer, moneylender, other area farmer, family or
friend, or other.
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Figure 1. Supermarket retail outlets in Nicaragua, 2000-2009.
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Figure 2. Fresh vegetable suppliers to Nicaraguan supermarket chains, 2001-2007.
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Tables
Table 1. Mean Duration of Supply Relationship, by Supplier Status and Supermarket
Chain
n Mean supply (s.d.) min max
relationship
duration (years)
Walmart
Current suppliers 168 2.7 (1.9) 0 7
Discontinued suppliers 144 1.7 (1.3) 1 7
La Colonia
Current suppliers 34 2.9 (2.0) 0 7
Discontinued suppliers 2 1.0 . 1 1
Other
Current suppliers 10 1.9 (1.3) 1 4
Discontinued suppliers 6 2.2 (2.4) 1 7
Multiple
Current suppliers 32 3.7 (2.0) 1 7
Total 396 2.40
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Table 2. Total Crops Grown and Sold by Suppliers in 2007, Disaggregated by Quan-
tity Sold to the Supermarket in 2007.
Crops sold to n Total crops grown Total crops sold,
supermarket (2007 mean) all markets (2007 mean)
Supplied 1 crop in 2007 169 4.3 2.3
Supplied 2 crops in 2007 54 4.7 2.8
Supplied 3 crops in 2007 20 6.5 3.7
Supplied 4 crops in 2007 1 14.0 5.0
Non-suppliers 466 2.7 1.4
Discontinued suppliers 152 4.1 2.6
Total farmers 862
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Table 3. Pre-supermarket Production Technologies of Suppliers, Shares
Group 2007 suppliers Exited suppliers
(share) (share)
Basic grains farmers with NGO assistance 0.09 0.11
Basic grains farmers without NGO assistance 0.25 0.42
Horticulture growers with irrigation 0.13 0.09
Horticulture growers without irrigation 0.39 0.23
Cash crop farmers 0.14 0.16
Total 1.00 1.00
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Table 4. Relationship Between Household and Geographic Covariates and Supply
Chain Participation Over Time, Linear Probability Model with Household Fixed
Effects.
Dependent variable:
New supply chain entrants
Productive asset index 0.066∗∗
*2001 dummy 0.021
*2002 dummy 0.008
*2003 dummy 0.032
*2004 dummy 0.037
*2005 dummy 0.009
*2006 dummy 0.022
*2007 dummy 0.078∗∗
*2008 dummy 0.023
Consumer durables asset index 0.007
*2001 dummy 0.008
*2002 dummy -0.009
*2003 dummy 0.003
*2004 dummy 0.001
*2005 dummy 0.001
*2006 dummy -0.025
*2007 dummy -0.061∗∗
*2008 dummy -0.017
Land (Ha) 0.003∗∗∗
*2001 dummy -0.001∗∗∗
*2002 dummy 0.000
*2003 dummy 0.000
*2004 dummy -0.002∗∗∗
*2005 dummy -0.001∗
*2006 dummy -0.001
*2007 dummy -0.003∗∗∗
*2008 dummy -0.002∗∗∗
Irrigation (Ha) 0.041
*2001 dummy 0.021
*2002 dummy 0.019
*2003 dummy 0.000
*2004 dummy 0.018
*2005 dummy 0.015
*2006 dummy 0.070∗∗
*2007 dummy 0.063∗∗
*2008 dummy 0.039
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Table 4, continued
Age of household head
*2001 dummy 0.000
*2002 dummy 0.000
*2003 dummy -0.001∗∗
*2004 dummy -0.001∗∗∗
*2005 dummy -0.002∗∗∗
*2006 dummy -0.004∗∗∗
*2007 dummy -0.005∗∗∗
*2008 dummy -0.004∗∗∗
Gender of household head (1=F)
*2001 dummy -0.009
*2002 dummy 0.001
*2003 dummy -0.012
*2004 dummy 0.009∗
*2005 dummy -0.045∗∗∗
*2006 dummy -0.093∗∗∗
*2007 dummy -0.093∗∗∗
*2008 dummy -0.057∗∗∗
Altitude of the farm (log mts)
*2001 dummy 0.000
*2002 dummy 0.008
*2003 dummy 0.009
*2004 dummy 0.008
*2005 dummy 0.031∗∗∗
*2006 dummy 0.086∗∗∗
*2007 dummy 0.085∗∗∗
*2008 dummy 0.044∗∗∗
Share of households reporting
community has water year round
*2001 dummy 0.045∗∗∗
*2002 dummy 0.045∗∗∗
*2003 dummy 0.087∗∗∗
*2004 dummy 0.094∗∗∗
*2005 dummy 0.153∗∗∗
*2006 dummy 0.286∗∗∗
*2007 dummy 0.297∗∗∗
*2008 dummy 0.232∗∗∗
Distance from closest supermarket
in the year 2000 (log mts)
*2001 dummy -0.006
*2002 dummy -0.017∗∗∗
*2003 dummy 0.006
*2004 dummy 0.011
*2005 dummy -0.022∗∗
*2006 dummy -0.034∗∗
*2007 dummy -0.023
*2008 dummy -0.023∗∗
n 6397
overall R2 0.11
Note: Variables in which there was no effect, in any year for either model: depth of water table, distance to
paved roads, landholdings farmed by parents, log of farmers’ own experience.
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Table 5. Recall Data Accuracy Ratios, Productive Assets
True 2000 +1
Recall 2000 +1
Tractors 1.031
Plow for tractor 1.034
Plow for oxen 1.374
Tractor harrow 1.015
Oxen harrow 1.005
Sower for tractor 1.007
Sower for oxen 0.997
Rastra for tractor 1.012
Cart for oxen 1.111
Backpack sprayer 1.424
Motorized backpack fumigator 1.021
Grass cutter 1.009
Combine harvester 1.001
Small mill 0.997
Cream separator 0.999
Coffee pulping machine 1.016
Chainsaw 1.003
Milking machine 1.000
Irrigation pump 1.016
Generator 1.000
Light truck 1.045
Truck 1.022
Mean 1.097
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Table 6. Relationship Between Productive Asset Index and Recall Ratio, 2001-2008
Assets
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Tractors - - - -∗ -∗ - - -
Plow for tractor + + + + + + + +
Plow for oxen - - - - - - + +
Tractor harrow - - - - - - - -
Oxen harrow - - - - - - - -
Sower for tractor + + + + + - + +
Sower for oxen -∗∗ -∗∗ -∗ - - - - -
Tiller +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗ +∗
Cart for oxen - - - - - - - -
Backpack sprayer + +∗ +∗∗ +∗∗ +∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗ +∗∗
Motorized backpack + + + + + - + +
fumigator
Grass cutter + + + + + - +∗ +∗
Combine harvester + + + + + - + +
Small mill -∗∗ -∗∗ -∗ -∗ - -∗ - -
Cream separatora +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗
Coffee pulping machine - - - - - - - -
Chainsaw - - - - - - - -
Irrigation pump - - - - - + + +
Generatora -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗ -∗∗∗
Light truck + + + + + + + +
Truck - - - - - - - -
a A small N effect. The asset was held by less than five households in 2000.
Note: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively
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Table 7. Annual Mean Asset and Land Holdings for Suppliers Before Joining the Su-
permarket Channel and Non-suppliers
n Productive Consumer Land Precision Flood
assets durables (mz) irrigation (mz) irrigation (mz)
Suppliers Suppliers Non Suppliers Non Suppliers Non Suppliers Non Suppliers Non
2001 400 0.14 0.20∗ 0.28 0.33 7.6 14.3∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 0.20∗∗∗ 0.04
2002 365 0.16 0.22∗ 0.32 0.37 7.8 14.2∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.21∗∗∗ 0.04
2003 344 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.41 8.1 14.1∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.21∗∗∗ 0.05
2004 302 0.25 0.32∗ 0.43 0.49 7.7 14.1∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 0.06
2005 256 0.34 0.37 0.50 0.59∗∗ 8.5 14.1∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 0.30∗∗∗ 0.06
2006 175 0.43 0.47 0.59 0.70∗∗ 8.9 14.0∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.02 0.36∗∗∗ 0.06
2007 74 0.62 0.50 0.77 0.80 7.9 14.0∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.02 0.32∗∗∗ 0.06
Note: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively
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Table 8. AnnualMean Asset and Land Holdings for NGO-assisted Suppliers and Non-
NGO Suppliers Before Joining the Supermarket Channel
n Productive Consumer Land
durables (mz)
Non-NGO NGO Non-NGO NGO Non-NGO NGO
2001 299 97 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.29 7.10 9.13
2002 269 96 0.15 0.18 0.33 0.29 7.35 9.20
2003 249 95 0.20 0.24 0.40 0.33 7.56 9.55
2004 216 73 0.24 0.30 0.46 0.38 7.48 9.10
2005 184 72 0.31 0.40 0.51 0.46 7.84 10.06
2006 123 52 0.43 0.55 0.62 0.50 8.64 8.79
2007 55 19 0.64 0.56 0.82 0.64 7.58 8.73
Note: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively
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Table 9. Standard Difference-in-Differences Estimation: Welfare Effects of Super-
market Supply Chain Participation
Productive Consumer Land
assets durables
Supplier control -0.06 0.04 -9.10∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (1.60)
Participation effect 0.16∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.49)
Year before participation 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.56
(0.02) (0.03) (0.43)
NGO assisted suppliers 0.09 -0.02 2.14
(0.06) (0.05) (1.69)
NGO*Participation 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.93)
NGO*Year before participation 0.01 0.01 0.42
(0.04) (0.05) (0.84)
Total n 7362 7362 7362
Total clusters 818 818 818
Note: Errors are clustered at the household level and year and regional dummies are also included.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively
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Table 10. Autocorrelation Corrected Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Welfare
Effects of Supermarket Supply Chain Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productive Productive Consumer Land
assets assets durables
Participation effect 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗ -0.01 0.56
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.45)
Year before participation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.44)
NGO assisted suppliers . 0.03 -0.03 0.97
(0.05) (0.05) (1.54)
NGO*Participation . 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.93)
NGO*Year before participation . 0.01 0.03 0.36
(0.05) (0.06) (0.84)
Total n 3564 3564 3564 3564
Total clusters 396 396 396 396
Note: Errors are clustered at the household level and year and regional dummies are also included.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics on Credit, by 2007 Supplier Status
Current Discontinued Non-suppliers
suppliers suppliers
Reported credit in 2007 (n) 163 83 111
Share of group 0.65 0.55 0.24
Credit borrowed
(USD 2007) 1544.98 1242.88 1013.82
(1376.16) (1446.05) (1462.42)
Credit sources, total 1.08 1.09 1.01
(0.32) (0.29) (0.09)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Sample is sub-sample of farmers who reported using credit in
2007.
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